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Abstract— There are increasing concerns about possible 
malicious modifications of integrated circuits (ICs) used in 
critical applications. Such attacks are often referred to as 
hardware Trojans. While many techniques focus on hardware 
Trojan detection during IC testing, it is still possible for attacks 
to go undetected. Using a combination of new design techniques 
and new memory technologies, we present a new approach that 
detects a wide variety of hardware Trojans during IC testing and 
also during system operation in the field. Our approach can also 
prevent a wide variety of attacks during synthesis, 
place-and-route, and fabrication of ICs. It can be applied to any 
digital system, and can be tuned for both traditional and 
split-manufacturing methods. We demonstrate its applicability 
for both ASICs and FPGAs. Using fabricated test chips with 
Trojan emulation capabilities and also using simulations, we 
demonstrate: 1. The area and power costs of our approach can 
range between 7.4-165% and 0.07-60%, respectively, depending 
on the design and the attacks targeted; 2. The speed impact can 
be minimal (close to 0%); 3. Our approach can detect 99.998% of 
Trojans (emulated using test chips) that do not require detailed 
knowledge of the design being attacked; 4. Our approach can 
prevent 99.98% of specific attacks (simulated) that utilize 
detailed knowledge of the design being attacked (e.g., through 
reverse-engineering). 5. Our approach never produces any false 
positives, i.e., it does not report attacks when the IC operates 
correctly. 
 
Index Terms —	   Hardware Security, Hardware Trojan, 3D 
Integration, Resistive RAM, Concurrent Error Detection, 
Randomized Codes, Split-manufacturing, Reliable Computing. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HERE is growing concern about the trustworthiness of 
integrated circuits (ICs). If an untrusted party fabricates an 
IC, there is potential for an adversary to insert a malicious 
hardware Trojan [1], an unauthorized modification of the IC 
resulting in incorrect functionality and/or sensitive data being 
exposed [2]. These include (but are not limited to) [3]: 
a) Modification of functional behavior through logic changes: 
For example, extra logic gates may be inserted to force an 
incorrect logic value on a wire at some (arbitrary) point in 
time (Fig. 1a) [2].   
b) Electrical modification: For example, extra capacitive 
loading may be placed on a circuit path to alter timing 
characteristics of the IC (Fig. 1b) [2].    
c) Reliability degradation: For example, aging of transistors 
(e.g., Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI)) may 
be accelerated, degrading reliability (Fig. 1c) [4].  
A hardware Trojan is detected when we report malicious 
modifications to an IC. A hardware Trojan is prevented when  
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we stop a hardware Trojan from being inserted. Part of the 
challenge in detecting or preventing hardware Trojans arises 
from the fact that the methods for inserting Trojan attacks are 
numerous (e.g., [2][5] for a comprehensive list).  
 
Fig. 1. Examples of hardware Trojans. a) Modification of functional behavior 
through logic changes; b) Electrical changes such as changing timing 
characteristics; c) Reliability changes such as accelerating aging with NBTI.  
 
Trojan insertion methods include (but are not limited to): 
• Modification of RTL or layout by malicious CAD tools 
without the designer’s knowledge [6].  
• IC modification anytime between tapeout and fabrication, 
since it is possible to reverse engineer (complete or partial) 
netlists from layouts [7][8]. Such modifications may be 
applied to all or a sample of fabricated ICs. IC modification 
can span a wide range from circuit modification to 
modification of the doping profile of a few transistors [9].  
• Malicious reprogramming of systems implemented in 
reconfigurable platforms (such as FPGAs) with incorrect 
functionality before startup or during field operation [10]. 
• Leakage of information, e.g., through fluctuations in IC 
power consumption [11]. 
Existing techniques for hardware Trojan detection exhibit 
one or more of the following limitations (in-depth discussion 
in Section VII): 
1. Some techniques rely on IC testing for Trojan detection, 
which alone limits the scope of Trojans. For example, 
Trojans activated by a “time-bomb” [2][12] or accelerated 
circuit aging [4] may not be detected. 
2. Nondestructive visual inspections can be circumvented by 
carefully hiding Trojans [9]. For example, an adversary can 
change the doping profile of transistors. Without IC 
delayering, detection becomes increasingly difficult due to 
limited imaging depth, especially for 3D ICs [53]. 
3. Destructive IC testing is effective only when the percentage 
of ICs attacked is high (e.g., many chips on a wafer must be 
attacked), as shown in Section VII.A. 
4. IC fingerprinting, such as circuit path delays, leakage 
power, heat or switching activity, relies on statistical models 
to distinguish between malicious activities vs. variability 
during manufacturing or normal operation. This makes 
sufficiently small Trojans undetectable [13]. Moreover, such 
techniques are prone to reporting false positives [90].  
5. Error-detecting codes [16] can be compromised if the code 
construction is known. 
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This paper presents a Trojan Prevention and Detection 
(TPAD) architecture for digital systems. TPAD enables 
test-time and runtime detection of Trojans inserted during 
fabrication. TPAD prevents insertion of Trojans during 
fabrication based on sophisticated reverse-engineering of the 
design being fabricated. TPAD also prevents Trojan insertion 
during logic synthesis and layout design.  
In this paper, we assume that logic synthesis tools, physical 
design tools, as well as IC fabrication are untrusted, meaning 
CAD tools and/or foundries can insert Trojans (Fig. 2a). 
However, we do require the RTL or system specification as 
well as system assembly to be trusted, meaning that an 
adversary cannot insert a Trojan during these stages.  
 
Fig. 2. a) Assumptions on when Trojans can be inserted or activated. b) 
Assumptions on vulnerable system and chip components. 
 
The following are some of the important TPAD features: 
1. TPAD detects hardware Trojans that produce incorrect 
Boolean logic value(s) that propagate to sequential elements 
(flip-flops, latches), on-chip memories, or I/O pins. 
2. TPAD has a 0% false positive rate, i.e., it does not report 
Trojan detection when the IC operates correctly. 
3. TPAD can be used for Trojan detection concurrently during 
post-manufacture IC testing and also during field operation 
(concurrently during system operation or through periodic 
testing). As a result, Trojans triggered by rare events such as 
time bomb attacks can be detected. If used in conjunction 
with system-level recovery techniques (such as those used 
for fault-tolerant computing), it may be possible to recover 
from many attacks (Appendix B). Since TPAD significantly 
improves the observability of signals inside an IC, test-time 
Trojan detection is expected to be significantly enhanced 
compared to traditional functional testing. 
4. The hardware overhead associated with TPAD is flexible, 
and can be adjusted based on targeted attack models and 
implemented functionality. 
5. TPAD can be used in conjunction with (or without) 
split-manufacturing [17]. TPAD can be combined with 
emerging non-volatile memories (e.g., Resistive RAM or 
RRAM) and their monolithic 3D integration [18] to reduce 
hardware overheads. 
6. TPAD can be combined with a secure EDA tool flow 
(Section VI) to prevent insertion of Trojans during logic 
synthesis and physical design. 
7. Currently, TPAD does not target Trojans that leak 
information without modifying logic values transmitted 
through the I/Os of the attacked IC, e.g., using a radio 
inserted maliciously or through fluctuations in power 
consumption [11].  
Our overall approach was briefly outlined without many 
details in [102]. In this paper, we present an in-depth 
description of TPAD, experimental results from test chips, as 
well as various implementation trade-offs with respect to area, 
power, and delay. The TPAD architecture is introduced in 
Section II and Section III. Section IV presents an 
implementation of the TPAD architecture that can be used for 
any arbitrary digital system. For general processor designs, 
such as OpenRISC [39], the key results of TPAD are: 
1. Area overheads range from 114% to 165% with 34% to 
61% power overheads. 
2. Near 0% speed impact can be achieved (through additional 
pipelining in the TPAD architecture). 
3. The corresponding detection rate for uninformed attacks 
(attacks that do not require detailed knowledge of the 
design before inserting a Trojan) ranges from 87.5%-99.6%. 
4. TPAD prevents sophisticated attacks requiring some 
detailed knowledge of the implemented design (launched by 
CAD tools or foundries) with a rate ranging from 96.2% to 
99.98% (Section III).  
In Section IV.C, we also demonstrate TPAD for fabricated 
FPGA test chips. Section V presents TPAD implementations 
for specialized (accelerator) designs, such as a Lempel-Ziv  
(LZ77) data compressor test chip [45] and a Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT) engine [41]. For such accelerators, the key 
results are: 
1. TPAD area overheads can be 7.4%. 
2. TPAD detects 99.998% of uninformed attacks.  
 We further show that for LZ77 data compression, 
performance metrics such as compression ratio (CR) can be 
traded off for area overhead with no impact on Trojan 
detection and prevention. 
In Section VI, we discuss how to TPAD can be used to 
prevent logic synthesis and physical design tools from 
inserting Trojans. Section VII compares and contrasts  existing 
Trojan detection and prevention approaches vs. TPAD. 
Section VIII concludes the paper. 
Appendix A presents a detailed discussion of various attack 
types. Appendix B discusses possible approaches to recover 
from Trojans. 
II.  SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW 
TPAD is derived from the concept of Concurrent Error 
Detection (CED) [19] for fault-tolerant computing. The 
“classical” CED approach is illustrated in Fig 3a: given a 
function, an Output Characteristic Predictor (OCP) predicts an 
output characteristic (e.g., parity of output bits) for each input 
to that function. Another function (checker) calculates the 
actual output characteristic and checks it against the predicted 
output characteristic. The checker reports an error whenever 
the two do not match. However, the problem of detecting 
attacks by hardware Trojans is different than CED for 
fault-tolerant computing for the following reasons:  
1. CED for fault-tolerant computing generally targets single 
faults (that may occur at random depending on the fault 
model). For example, CED techniques that predict output 
parity (or the count of 0’s or 1’s in an output word) can be 
easily compromised if an attacker inserts a hardware Trojan 
which flips output bits of the function such that the number 
of 1’s in a given output word is preserved.  
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2. An attacker must not be able to derive the OCP; otherwise, 
the attacker could modify both the function outputs and the 
OCP outputs such that the checker does not detect errors.  
3. CED techniques for fault-tolerant computing generally 
assume that only one of the units (function, OCP, checkers) 
is faulty (at any given time). For hardware Trojans, one 
cannot make such assumptions.  
 
Fig. 3. a) General block diagram of a concurrent error detection scheme; b) 
Separate CED techniques for separate functions of a chip. 
 
One option is to implement a chip entirely on a 
reconfigurable platform such as an FPGA (with concurrent 
error detection for the mapped logic). This can potentially 
mitigate vulnerabilities to sophisticated attacks that rely on 
reverse-engineering. However, CMOS FPGAs can incur 
significant area and performance overheads compared to 
ASICs (17-27x area and 18-26x performance in [20]). While 
monolithic 3D integration has been shown to somewhat 
reduce these costs (5-8x area overheads and 10-15x 
performance overheads in [21]), these overheads may still be 
too high for many applications. Further, current trends indicate 
that an increasing number of accelerators (e.g., signal 
processing blocks) [22] are being embedded in FPGA chips. 
These accelerators, along with I/Os, are vulnerable to Trojans. 
Thus, FPGAs that are manufactured by untrusted foundries 
can still be vulnerable. 
TPAD overcomes the limitations of classical CED 
techniques. At the same time, it avoids the high overheads of 
FPGAs through selective hardware programmability (Section 
III) in Trojan checking circuitry. 
Fig. 2b shows a digital system with circuit components 
vulnerable to Trojan attacks highlighted in red. The system 
operates in a trusted environment; however, all chips are 
vulnerable to Trojans. While wires (or channels) between 
chips may not vulnerable to attacks (since the system may be 
assembled in a trusted environment), any chip with a Trojan 
may use them to send incorrect data.  
A block diagram of the system architecture with TPAD is 
shown in Fig. 4. As mentioned in Section I, we assume the 
system is assembled in a trusted environment. Thus, any 
Trojan attack within the system will originate from at least one 
chip. Each chip in the system encodes its outputs and receives 
encoded inputs. Specifically, Chip 1 outputs data and 
corresponding check bits so Chip 2 can use them to verify the 
data (Section II.A-B). Encoded error signals sent from each 
chip convey the state of all checkers within the chip (Section 
II.E). The error monitors (Section II.F) then interpret these 
error signals and determine whether an attack has occurred.  
Each chip implemented using TPAD includes four modules 
(Fig. 5): output encoding, input encoding, CED-based Trojan 
detection, and error encoding (Sections II.A-E). 
 
Fig. 4. Trusted system. Each chip is implemented with TPAD. Data 
communication between chips is encoded. Error monitors check encoded error 
signals and determine if an attack has occurred. 
 
Fig. 5. TPAD architecture for each chip, including output encoding, input 
decoding, CED for logic, and error encoding. 
 
A. Output encoding  
 TPAD encodes primary outputs (Fig. 6a) using randomized 
parity encoding (Section IV.A). A separate encoding is used 
for each subsequent chip in the system that receives a different 
set of the primary outputs; the same encoding is used for chips 
receiving the same set of primary outputs (Fig. 6b). The 
primary outputs and their check bits can be transmitted to 
destination chips serially (same or different pins) or in 
parallel. 
 
Fig. 6. a) Output encoding; b) Same encodings for the same subset of primary 
outputs; separate encodings for different subsets of outputs; c) Input decoding. 
 
A randomized parity codeword (explained in Section IV.A) 
is calculated for the primary outputs during each clock cycle. 
The check bits of this codeword are then XOR’ed with the 
previous output check bits (stored in flip-flops), to form the 
output check bits (e.g., 1101012 ⊕ previous output check bits 
0101012 produces output check bits 1000002). The output 
check bits are then stored and used in the next clock cycle. 
Thus, the output encoding at a particular time is a function of 
the history of the primary outputs in the preceding clock 
cycles (the starting check bits are initialized at chip startup to 
be uniformly random). 
In order for a chip to check its primary inputs, it must use 
the same randomized parity encoding scheme as the sender’s 
output encoding. To ensure this property, FIFOs or proper 
handshaking protocols may be required.  
An attacker can attempt to derive the randomized parity 
scheme by adding hardware to the chip that stores randomized 
parity outputs and solves linear equations. However, even an 
attack that requires fewer additional gates can usually be 
detected using nondestructive post-manufacture inspections; 
thus, a complex attack such as this is expected to be detected 
(Appendix A). 
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B. Input decoding 
The primary inputs (Fig. 6c) of each chip are encoded 
according the method described in Section II.A. The decoding 
process checks for attacks at the outputs of the sender as well 
as attacks at its own inputs. Suppose that, primary inputs (e.g., 
FA16) and input check bits (e.g., 116) are received. The input 
check bits are then XOR-ed with the previous cycle’s input 
check bits (e.g., B16) to calculate the expected randomized 
parity bits (e.g. 116⊕ B16=A16). The actual randomized parity 
bits are calculated from the primary inputs (e.g., A16). Since 
both sets of randomized parity bits (expected and actual) are 
equal, no attack has occurred in this case. However, when a 
pin attack (Appendix A) occurs, the expected parity bits will 
not match the actual bits; thus, the pin attack will be detected.  
C. Logic CED 
On-chip logic is protected using CED (Fig. 5) as introduced 
at the beginning of Section II. When the combinational logic is 
separated into independent blocks, different CED schemes 
may be used for each of the blocks as shown in Fig. 3b. A 
general CED technique for any digital system is discussed in 
Section IV, while application-specific techniques are 
discussed in Section V. These techniques overcome the 
limitations of classical CED in detecting Trojan attacks. 
D. Memory CED 
Trojans inserted in an on-chip RAM (e.g. read/write logic, 
address decoder logic, and memory cells) can alter the data, 
the location in which the data is stored, or the operation of the 
RAM (read vs. write). To detect such attacks, the RAM is 
protected using a randomized parity code (Section IV.A). In 
TPAD, during a write operation, both the address (e.g., BE16) 
and data bits (e.g., 12416) are used to calculate check bits (e.g., 
616) (Fig. 7a) to ensure that correct data is written to the 
correct location. These check bits are stored along with the 
data. During read operation, the address (e.g., BE16) and data 
(e.g., 12416) are used to calculate the expected check bits (e.g., 
616). These are compared with the check bits read out from the 
memory (e.g., 616) and an attack is detected if they do not 
match. For example, if the same data and check bits (as the 
above example) were retrieved during a read operation for a 
different address (e.g. BF16), the expected check bits would 
not match the retrieved check bits (e.g. 216 ≠ 616). To hide the 
randomized parity code construction from adversaries, both 
the encoder and checkers are protected with switchbox 
programmability (Section III).   
For detecting attacks related to a write operation, the RAM 
must operate in write-though mode, a feature in many RAMs 
[25]. This means that during a write operation, the data that is 
being written is sensed and appears at the output of the RAM. 
Thus, immediately following a write operation, the input and 
output of the RAM block can be checked for attacks. Latches 
are used to ensure Data Out only changes during a read 
operation (Fig. 7a). 
Table I shows the specific checking step that detects a 
Trojan for each operation (read, write, or idle). Fig. 7b shows 
the relative area of this Trojan detection scheme for various 
numbers of check bits as well as different RAM sizes. A word 
size of 16 bits (i.e. data in and data out were both 16-bits 
wide) was used for each case. GlobalFoundries 65nm SRAM 
compiler was used to obtain RAM areas. Checking circuits 
were synthesized and placed-and-routed using the 
GlobalFoundries 65nm CMOS library. 
 
Fig. 7. Memory architecture. a) Block diagram of data encoding before writes 
and checking after reads/writes. Blocks with programmability indicated in 
green (Section III); b) Relative area cost of implementing trusted RAM 
compared to a non-trusted RAM vs. number of check bits. 
E. Error signal encoding 
Error signals from various CED checkers are inherently 
vulnerable.  For example, if a single bit is used to indicate that 
a Trojan attack has been detected, an adversary can simply 
attack that bit to indicate no attack. 
Totally self-checking checkers [19] are also inadequate in 
detecting Trojan attacks, because an adversary can insert a 
Trojan into the checker that can make the checker output 
appear to be valid.  
 A uniform random sequence might be considered to 
prevent an adversary from guessing the meaning of the error 
signal since it has maximum entropy [26]. However, a 
deterministic error signal is needed so that it can be interpreted 
by the error monitor (Section II.F); thus, a Linear-Feedback 
-Shift-Register (LFSR) [27] is natural for this purpose. The 
polynomial and seed are made programmable to prevent an 
adversary from compromising the LFSR during design and 
fabrication. XOR gates are inserted in a shift register as shown 
in Fig. 8a to ensure that any primitive polynomial of degree L 
can be realized. Programmability can be realized with RRAM 
switchboxes for low area cost (Section III). 
Because of the large number of primitive polynomials for a 
sufficiently large degree (e.g., for L=64 it is on the order of 
1017 [103]), the probability that an adversary correctly guesses 
which polynomial will be used during runtime is negligible. If 
the adversary is able to observe outputs of the LFSR during 
runtime, the evolution of the error signal may be deduced [28]. 
However, even an attack that requires fewer additional gates 
can usually be detected using nondestructive post-manufacture 
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TABLE I. POSSIBLE ATTACKS IN RAM AND TPAD DETECTION METHOD  
Operation Effect of Trojan Effect at Read/Write Checker  
Read Wrong address read 
Wrong data read 
Write instead of read 
Does not read 
Check bits at RAM_Out incorrect 
Check bits at RAM_Out incorrect 
RAM_Out ≠ Data_Out 
Check bits at RAM_Out incorrect 
Write Wrong write address 
Wrong data written 
Read instead of write 
Does not write 
Check bits at RAM_Out incorrect 
Check bits at RAM_Out incorrect 
RAM_In ≠ RAM_Out 
RAM_In ≠ RAM_Out. 
Idle Reads instead of idle 
Writes instead of idle 
RAM_Out = Data_Out 
RAM_In = RAM_Out 
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inspections; thus, a complex attack such as this is expected to 
be detected (Appendix A). 
 
Fig.  8. a) LFSR of length L with programmable feedback polynomial. b) 
Sample CED checker design with r=3 bits. 
 
A subset of r bits in the LFSR of a given design (e.g. 3516), 
determined during design time, is used to encode the error 
signals for the CED checker. This subset can be chosen 
arbitrarily since the characteristic polynomial and seed of the 
LFSR are programmable. The checker must operate such that 
when no attack is detected, the error signal will be equal to the 
r LFSR bits (e.g. 3516), shown in Fig. 8b. If the error signal 
takes any other value (e.g. 3616), an attack is detected. The 
subset of r bits can be different for different chip designs. 
All checkers within the same clock domain use the same 
LFSR. In any clock cycle when there is no attack detected, all 
of these checkers output the exact same signal. Thus, signals 
can be combined to reduce the number of output pins needed 
for the chip. To do so, each corresponding bit (e.g. bit 1 of 
checker 1, bit 1 of checker 2 etc.) is combined as shown in 
Fig. 9. When the LFSR bit is 0, the corresponding bit of the 
error signal is the OR of all of the checker outputs for that bit. 
When the LFSR bit is 1, the AND of the checker outputs is 
chosen. Checkers from different clock domains (integer and 
non-integer multiples) will have different LFSRs with proper 
FIFOs or handshaking to collect error signals. 
 
Fig. 9. Error signal encoding. For each of the r bits, if LFSR value is 0, the OR 
of corresponding checker output bits is chosen. If it is 1, the AND is chosen. 
F. Error monitors 
Error signals must be interpreted by a trusted party to 
ultimately decide whether an attack has occurred. Separate 
LFSRs are used within each error monitor to generate 
expected error signals. These LFSRs are configured the same 
(characteristic polynomial, seed, and clock) as the LFSRs that 
generate the corresponding error signals. The error signal 
received should match the expected error signal; otherwise, an 
attack has occurred. To realize this error monitor, an older 
technology node from a trusted foundry may be used.   
III. SWITCHBOX PROGRAMMABILITY 
As discussed in Section II, the output encoding, input 
decoding, logic CED, and error encoding blocks in Fig. 5 must 
be protected against modifications that stop Trojans from 
being detected. TPAD builds on ideas from privacy techniques 
in social networks [29] in order to prevent circuit 
reverse-engineering and sophisticated attacks. We represent 
logic gates in a netlist as vertices in a graph, and wires as 
directed edges between vertices. The netlists corresponding to 
the output encoding, input decoding, logic CED, and error 
encoding blocks in Fig. 5 are modified with a technique that 
prevents adversaries from gaining detailed knowledge of their 
functionalities. The technique has two important features: 
1. Each modification to a netlist will require adding an extra 
logic element (Definition 1). The area and power cost of 
each such element is made small via the use of an emerging 
memory technology (discussed in this section). 
2. The total number of modifications (overall cost) to a given 
netlist is flexible, and can be tuned based on the level of 
security desired. We show (Section III.A-V) that one can 
ensure exceptionally high security against a very wide 
variety of attacks while maintaining low total cost. 
While the adversary can still bypass the checkers by storing a 
previous state of the system with additional hardware, these 
attacks can be easily detected using non-destructive 
post-manufacturing inspections (Appendix A). TPAD uses 
random switching [30] to hide functionality of checkers. 
Definition 1. Let 𝑒! = (𝑥, 𝑧), and 𝑒! = (𝑦,𝑤) be two disjoint 
wires (i.e., 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 ≠ 𝑧 ≠ 𝑤).  We say 𝑒! and 𝑒! are switchable 
if they can be reconfigured as 𝑒! = (𝑥,𝑤) and 𝑒! = (𝑦, 𝑧).  
This can also be generalized to larger sets of wires. Let  𝑆 = 𝑎!, 𝑏! , 𝑎!, 𝑏! ,… , 𝑎! , 𝑏!  
be any arbitrary set of 𝑘 disjoint wires. We say the wires in 𝑆 
are switchable if for any permutation 𝜋: 𝑘   →    [𝑘], 𝑆 can be 
reconfigured as 𝑆 = 𝑎!, 𝑏!  (!) , 𝑎!, 𝑏!  (!) ,… , 𝑎! , 𝑏!  (!) .  
We refer to any circuitry that makes wires switchable as a 
switchbox (SB). The total number of possible states of all the 
SBs in a circuit is referred to as the number of configurations 
of the circuit. An example of modifying a circuit using a SB is 
illustrated in Fig. 10. The circuit in Fig. 10a acts as a one-bit 
full-adder when the SB is configured as shown. However, if 
the SB is configured as shown in Fig. 10b, the circuit 
computes a different function. Thus, when certain wires in a 
design are made switchable, attackers must know the intended 
SB configuration to deduce the intended functionality.  
However, simply inserting a SB into a design does not 
ensure that an incorrect configuration will lead to incorrect 
functionality. For example, a degenerate case of SB insertion 
is shown in Fig. 11. Regardless of the configuration of the SB, 
the circuit will behave as a full-adder. For this reason, our 
technique for inserting SBs involves formal equivalence 
checking to verify that each SB that is inserted can lead to 
different functionality (Step IV of Algorithm 1). 
 
Fig. 10. Example of modifying a full-adder with a two-input switchbox. There 
are two possible configurations: a) parallel mode or b) crossed mode. 
 
Fig. 11. Degenerate SB insertion in a full-adder with a two-input switchbox. 
Both configurations of the SB yield the same functionality. 
  
However, degenerate cases can still occur when a larger 
number of SBs are inserted into a design. For instance, if x 
two-input SBs are inserted into a design, there are 2x total 
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configurations of the SBs. If x is small, it is feasible to run 
equivalence checking to verify that only one of the 2x 
configurations yields the intended functionality of the design. 
However the number of equivalence checks needed to verify 
this property grows exponentially in x, making the problem of 
guaranteeing no degenerate cases intractable for large x. 
To simulate percentage of degenerate cases for a large 
number of SBs, 64 SBs were inserted in an OpenRISC [39] 
instruction fetch module. 106 incorrect SB configurations were 
applied and equivalence checking was performed to compare 
the resulting functionality with the intended design. No 
degenerate cases were found. We note however, that only a 
small fraction (0.05%) of the 264 different configurations were 
explored in these simulations. Therefore a larger experiment 
would need to be performed in order to verify that degenerate 
cases are highly unlikely for a given design. The percentage of 
degenerate cases also depends on symmetry properties of the 
function being covered, and the SB insertion technique would 
need to account for such properties in order to provide 
guarantees.  
If an SB insertion technique ensures the realization of 
multiple checking function instances using the same set of 
SBs, the presence of degenerate cases can be circumvented. 
For example, if one could insert SBs into a logic CED checker 
in such a way that many CED techniques, e.g., exponentially 
many randomized parity codes of a given length (Section 
IV.A), can be realized, then it would be very difficult for the 
adversary to infer which particular CED technique would be 
used during runtime. One way of ensuring multiple CED 
techniques is to insert SBs in the OCP and the checker before 
logic synthesis such that the randomized parity functions may 
be reconfigured. However, this can result in much of the 
original function being retained in the OCP, making the design 
vulnerable to certain sophisticated attacks (discussed in 
Section III.A). These vulnerabilities can allow an adversary to 
insert undetectable Trojans in those parts of the OCP without 
any knowledge of the CED technique being used. Thus, the 
SB insertion method described in this section still must be 
used after synthesis to ensure an adversary cannot 
reverse-engineer the OCP and the checker.  
In hardware, a low area-cost technique for switching sets of 
wires is enabled through the use of Resistive RAM (RRAM) 
technology. Advances in RRAM technology have shown the 
feasibility of monolithically integrating RRAM with CMOS 
[32]. Its cell size has been shown to be smaller than other 
NVRAM technologies at 4F2 (F is the feature size of the 
technology node) [33]. Additionally, it has been used recently 
to secure memory designs against unauthorized read accesses 
[31]. RRAM provides a non-volatile configuration memory 
for SBs so chips do not have to be reconfigured when the 
power is cycled, making chip boot-up more secure since there 
is no need for potentially insecure programming sequences to 
be sent to the chip. Moreover, when the design rarely requires 
reprogramming, long write times of the RRAM are negligible. 
Fig. 12 illustrates the design of an RRAM SB as described 
and fabricated in [32]. Each cell consists of two RRAM 
elements arranged as a resistive divider, a programming 
transistor, and a pass transistor. The two RRAM elements in 
each cell are always programmed to be in different states, thus 
pulling the pass transistor gate either high or low, allowing or 
denying a given input to propagate to an output. The address 
bus (addr), program data in (prg_in), and write enable (we), 
are only used when configuring the SB, making the 
programming interface much like an SRAM interface. The 
SBs can be implemented with as little as 0.04% area overhead 
compared to the rest of a chip (Section V.A) since the RRAM 
cells can be placed in the metal interconnects above the active 
layer of transistors on a chip as described in [102]. 
Alternatively, standard technology such as flip-flops or lookup 
tables (LUTs) can be used to configure SBs, though 
non-volatility would be sacrificed and the area cost would be 
significantly higher.  
 
Fig. 12. Schematic of RRAM-based switchbox [32]. Address bus (addr), 
program data in (prg_in), and write enable (we) are used to program the 
switchbox to a particular configuration. 
 
Algorithm 1 gives a method for randomly inserting 
switchboxes into any netlist, given the target number of 
configurations as an input. Fig. 13 illustrates the outcomes of 
the steps of Algorithm 1, when performed on the circuit shown 
in Fig. 13a, with 4 as the number of configurations per output 
bit.  Steps I-II are illustrated in Fig. 13a and Steps III-V are 
illustrated in Fig. 13b. The effectiveness of this algorithm in 
preventing sophisticated attacks is evaluated in Section III.A.  
While it is possible to insert SBs into the original functions 
instead of the checking circuitry, this leaves the entire 
end-to-end CED scheme visible and it can be modified to 
never detect errors in the original functions. Thus, a trusted 
end-to-end CED scheme is imperative for detecting Trojans. 
When split-manufacturing is used, SB programmability is not 
needed to prevent attacks that require detailed knowledge of 
the design. The area savings with split-manufacturing are 
discussed in Section IV.B - V.A. 
 
Fig. 13. Steps of Algorithm 1 applied to a 2-bit ALU targeting 4 
configurations per output bit; a) Step I: choose v and its neighborhood 
(highlighted in red); Step II: choose u and its neighborhood (highlighted in 
blue); b) Step III: Place SBs (shown in green); Step IV: Test that SBs are not 
degenerate (satisfied) and choose configurations (shown in dotted lines); Step 
V:  Test for at least 2 SBs within the logic cone of each output bit (satisfied). 
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A. Resilience to reverse-engineering and sophisticated attacks 
In this subsection, we provide results showing the 
effectiveness of SB programmability in preventing attacks that 
require some detailed knowledge of the design. First, we state 
an assumption that is used to set the number of configurations 
input to Algorithm 1 when it is applied in Sections IV.B-V. 
Assumption 1. If an adversary learns the definition of any 
characteristic function computed by any attack detection 
circuit (e.g., Logic CED, output encoding, input decoding), a 
Trojan can be inserted into the design that cannot be detected. 
For example, assume an OCP with two check bits is 
designed for a function with four outputs. Assume the first 
check bit is used to predict the parity of output bits 1 and 2, 
while the second check bit is used to predict the parity of 
output bits 3 and 4. If an adversary figures out the first 
characteristic function and flips the first two bits at the output 
of the main function, this attack would not be detected. 
Assumption 1 is used in Step V of Algorithm 1. The Trojan 
detection circuitry is decomposed into separate logic cones for 
each output bit. Then, programmability is selectively inserted 
into each logic cone in order to hide the function that is used 
to compute each output bit. 
The following list states reverse-engineering attacks (e.g., 
attempts to gain some detailed knowledge about the intended 
functionality of a design) and how they are prevented by SB 
programmability. Each attack was simulated on an OpenRISC 
CPU protected with randomized parity codes (Section IV). 
The probability that the attack succeeded is shown in Table I. 
An attacker can try all possible SB configurations or examine 
the physical aspects (i.e., gates and/or wires) of the circuit or 
sub-circuits. A more general attack model (Configuration 
Prediction Attack) assumes the attacker can determine the 
correct configuration for each SB with a given probability. 
Even if this probability is high, the overall probability of 
reverse engineering the circuit can still be made negligible by 
inserting a large number of SBs. 
1. Brute Force Attacks: The attacker isolates a single output bit 
in the netlist, and searches through all possible SB 
configurations along the logic cone leading to it. For 
example, the adversary may configure the SBs in all 
possible ways, and create a list of all possible 
functionalities. Then the adversary may guess the intended 
configuration. We prevent these attacks by inserting a large 
number of SBs within each logic cone leading to an output 
bit in all of the Trojan detection circuits. For example, in 
Section IV.B, we insert between 64 and 80 SBs along every 
logic cone in the Trojan detection blocks of a CPU. The 
number of SB configurations of each cone (ranging from 264  
to 280) is too many to exhaustively test in order to 
reverse-engineer the functionality. 
2. Configuration Prediction (CP) Attacks: A 𝜃  CP attack 
assumes that the adversary can correctly guess the intended 
configuration of any individual SB with probability 1 − 𝜃. 
Since the intended configuration of each SB is chosen 
independently of the others, the minimum-bias strategy to 
guess the configurations of all the SBs in a circuit is to 
guess each SB configuration independently [105]. Hence, if 
there are x SBs within the logic cone leading to a 
characteristic bit, a 𝜃  CP attack assumes an adversary can 
guess the configuration of that logic cone correctly with 
probability 1 − 𝜃 ! . We prevent such attacks by inserting a 
large number of SBs within each logic cone leading to an 
output bit in all of the Trojan detection circuits, causing 
these attacks to succeed with negligible probability (i.e., x is 
made large so that 1 − 𝜃 ! will be small; Table II). 
3. Wire-length Tracing: If a physical design tool was given the 
intended configurations of the SBs, wire-lengths for the 
intended SB configurations could be optimized to minimize 
delay, while wire-lengths for incorrect configurations could 
be ignored. Then, an adversary could compare the 
wire-lengths of both configurations for each SB and find the 
one resulting in shorter wires. We prevent this attack by not 
providing the tool with the intended configurations (Section 
VI). Thus, no single SB configuration is optimized at the 
expense of others during physical design (Fig. 14a and 
Table II). To demonstrate this, SBs in the parallel 
configuration were inserted in various OpenRISC OCP 
designs (Section IV) with the intended configuration 
undisclosed to the physical design tool. The difference in 
the maximum wire-lengths for parallel (Lparallel) and crossed 
(Lcross) configurations was determined for each SB. If Lparallel 
< Lcross, the adversary would guess parallel; otherwise, the 
adversary would guess crossed. The median value (out of 
2,500 trials) of Lparallel – Lcross was 0, indicating that an 
adversary would guess correctly with probability 0.5. Thus, 
this attack provided no advantage over random guessing 
4. Drive Strength (DS) and Fanout (FO) Matching: If SBs 
were inserted post-physical design, an adversary would be 
able to match (strong or weak) driving cells at the inputs of 
SBs to (large or small) FOs at the outputs. For example, let 
SB inputs be driven by gates with DS 1x and 4x, and SB 
outputs have fanouts 1 pF and 4 pF. An adversary can guess 
that the 4x cell was meant to drive the 4 pF load to minimize 
delay, thus revealing the SB configuration. We prevent this 
Algorithm 1 [Random Switchbox (SB) Insertion] 
Inputs: Netlist 𝐺 = {𝑉,𝐸}, Number of configurations per output bit: 2! . 
Outputs: New netlist 𝐺! = {𝑉! ,𝐸!} with ≥ 2! configurations per output bit. 
Initialize:     𝐺! = 𝐺. 
Step I: Choose 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 uniformly at random and group all the vertices 
within radius 1 of 𝑣 ,𝑁!(𝑣). 
Step II: Search 𝐺! for 𝑢 ∈ 𝑉 s.t. in-degree and number of outputs of 𝑁!(𝑢) 
match 𝑁!(𝑣), and 𝑁!(𝑢) ∩ 𝑁!(𝑣) = ∅.   If not found, retry Step I.  
Step III:  Let 𝑁!(𝑣), 𝑁!(𝑢) each have a incoming wires {(𝑥! , 𝑧!),… , (𝑥! , 𝑧!)} and {(𝑦!,𝑤!),… , (𝑦! ,𝑤!)}, and  b outputs {𝑠!,… , 𝑠!} and {𝑡!,… , 𝑡!} respectively.  
For 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑎: 
Insert two-input SB in 𝐺! with inputs (𝑥! ,𝑦!), outputs (𝑧! ,𝑤!).  
For 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑏: 
Insert two-input SB in 𝐺! with inputs !𝑠! , 𝑡!!, first output for all 
outgoing edges of 𝑠! , second output for all outgoing edges of 𝑡! . 
Step IV:  For each SB inserted in Step III: 
Consider 𝐺 with only this SB added.  
Compare functionality with this SB crossed vs. this SB parallel. 
If equivalent: Remove this SB. 
Else:  With probability ½, adjust input and output wires of SB 
so that crossed SB will yield same functionality as 𝐺.  
Step V: Let 𝐺! denote the subgraph of 𝐺! corresponding to the logic cone 
which ends at the i-th output bit of 𝐺. If ∀𝑖, there are at least 𝑡 SBs 
in 𝐺!, output 𝐺!. Otherwise repeat steps I-IV. 
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attack by inserting SBs before physical design and using 
SBs with equal capacitances at the input ports. Since 
physical design will size both driving cells to drive the SB, 
the DS of both inputs will be similar, regardless of FO. This 
attack was implemented 4,000 times on various OpenRISC 
OCP designs. Random guesses for the SB configuration 
were used to break ties. As shown in Fig. 14b, this attack 
provided only a 0.01% increase in success rate when 
compared to random guessing.  
5. Subcircuit Matching: An adversary can search for 
isomorphic subcircuits shared by a function and its OCP. 
Since the OCP is a composition of characteristic functions 
with the main function, isomorphic subcircuits may be used 
to compute the same logic values in both blocks. An attack 
that flips the outputs of both subcircuits would not be 
detected by the CED tests, since check bits would still 
match. SB insertion breaks up logic cones in the OCP, 
leading to far fewer isomorphic subcircuits. Equal 
modification to the remaining isomorphic subcircuits is 
detected with high probability, indicating that even though 
they are constructed with the same logic gates, they are not 
used to compute the same logic values (Table II). This 
attack was implemented on the OpenRISC CPU (Section 
IV) 40,000 times and was unsuccessful every time. 
 
Fig. 14. a) Wire-length tracing results. The attack succeds 50% of the time.  
b) Drive Strength and Fanout Matching attack results. Using this attack 
resulted in only a 0.01% advantage in success rate over random guesing. 
IV. RANDOMIZED CODING FOR LOGIC CED AND SECURE I/OS  
A. Randomized parity codes 
 We assume the reader has familiarity with the basics of 
coding theory [24] and its use in fault-tolerant computing [19]. 
We provide only the minimum definitions here. The notation 
used is defined in Table III. All the presented codes are binary, 
but they can be extended to larger finite fields. 
Definition 2. A 𝑘 -dimensional parity function 𝑔: {0,1}! →0,1 , is a parity of a subset of bits of a k-dimensional binary 
vector. Explicitly,  ∀𝑥 ∈ {0,1}!: 
𝑔 𝑥 =    𝑎!𝑥!!!!!       𝑎! ∈ 0,1 . 
Definition 3. An (n,k) parity (linear) encoding 𝑔: {0,1}! →{0,1}!  is a mapping where each coordinate function is a 
k-dimensional parity function. We call n the blocklength of the 
code, and k the number of information bits. 
Definition 4. A parity-check matrix 𝐻 ∈ M𝑟×𝑛 𝔽2  for an (n,k) 
linear encoding 𝑔, is a binary matrix for which 𝐻𝑥! =   0 iff. ∃𝑦 ∈ {0,1}! s.t. 𝑔 𝑦 = 𝑥 . 𝐶 ⊆ {0,1}! with 𝐶 = 𝑥   ∈ 0,1 !      𝐻𝑥! = 0} is called the code. The elements of 𝐶 are called the 
codewords. A linear code is systematic if its parity-check 
matrix has form 𝐴 ∣ 𝐼!  where 𝐼! is the 𝑟×𝑟 identity matrix and 
r=n-k is the number of check bits. 
Fig. 15 illustrates how linear systematic codes are used in 
concurrent error detection [34]. The information bits of a 
codeword are computed by a logic function. The OCP predicts 
the corresponding check bits, and the checker computes the 
actual check bits and compares them with the prediction. We 
now introduce a randomized linear code construction. 
Construction 1 (Randomized Parity Codes). Let   𝑅!×! denote 
the ensemble of all (n,k) linear systematic codes with all rows 
and all columns in the parity-check matrix nonzero. An (n,k) 
randomized parity code is a code that has been sampled 
uniformly at random from  𝑅!×!. 
Randomization of the code choice, in conjunction with SB 
programmability (Section III), prevents an adversary from 
knowing the parity-check matrix. The nonzero constraint on 
each row of the parity-check matrix is to avoid the zero 
function. This function is useless for error detection, since it 
corresponds to a permanently grounded wire. The nonzero 
constraint on the columns is to ensure that each input bit is 
included in at least one parity function. Algorithm 2 constructs 
a randomized parity code.  
 
For any given error pattern, a code chosen uniformly at 
random from the ensemble of all (n,k) binary linear systematic 
codes will detect the errors with probability 1 − 0.5! . 
However, since Construction 1 introduces dependencies 
between columns in the parity-check matrix, the standard 
proof of the error detection probability will not hold [37]. Fig. 
15 therefore shows the detection probability for randomized 
parity codes, for k=100, simulated using Monte Carlo (30,000 
trials). The detection probability is 1 for single-bit errors and 
approaches 1 − 0.5! as the number of errors increases [38]. If a 
nonlinear code is used instead of a parity code, the detection 
probability for a large number of errors can be higher at the 
cost of additional area [35]. 
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TABLE II. REVERSE-ENGINEERING SUCCESS PROBABILITIES 
Type of Attack 
Configurations/Output bit 2!" 2!" 2!" 
Wire-length Tracing* 5.4×10!!" 2.1×10!!! 8.3×10!!" 
DS & FO Matching* 5.5×10!!" 2.1×10!!! 8.4×10!!" 
Subcircuit Matching* 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CP: θ = 0.1 1.18×10!! 5.08×10!! 2.18×10!! 
CP: θ = 0.05 0.0375 0.0249 0.0165 
* Simulated using OpenRISC w/ Randomized Parity codes (Section IV). 
TABLE III. NOTATION 0,1 !      Binary	  strings	  of	  length	  n	  𝑥! , 𝑖 ∈ ℤ 𝑖th	  element	  of	  vector	  𝑥.	    𝑥!  Transpose	  of	  vector	  𝑥.	  ⊕ Modulo-­‐2	  sum	  (XOR).	  𝔽! Binary	  Field:   0,1 	  with	  ⊕,  mod-­‐2	  multiplication	  𝑀!×! 𝔽  Set	  of	  𝑛×𝑘	  matrices	  over	  field	  𝔽.	  
Algorithm 2 [Randomized Parity Construction]. 
Inputs:     Number of information bits k. Number of check bits r. 
Output:    Parity-check matrix for an (r+k, k) randomized parity code. 
Step I: Choose a systematic parity-check matrix  𝐻 ∈ 𝑀!×(!!!)(𝔽!) 
uniformly at random. 
Step II:  If 𝐻 satisfies constraints of Construction 1: output  𝐻.  
 Else: repeat Steps I-II.  
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Fig. 15. General method to create an OCP. Detection probability for various 
number of check bits for k=100 are shown for randomized parity codes. 
B. OpenRISC CPU demonstration 
 To evaluate TPAD, we constructed an OpenRISC 1200 
CPU core [39] using randomized parity code checking 
(Section IV.A) for logic CED, input decoding, and output 
encoding. Designs were synthesized and place-and-routed 
with the Nangate 45nm CMOS standard cell library [40]. The 
number of check bits for each pipeline stage ranged from 3 to 
8 bits, and SB programmability (Section III) was included for 
all checking circuitry and I/Os. The same number of check bits 
was used for all pipeline stages within the processor. The 
relative size and power of the overall design for 3 check bits 
(which corresponds to a detection rate of 87.5%) is given in 
Fig. 16. This shows an area overhead of 114% and power 
overhead of 34%. The number of SB configurations used for 
each bit of both the OCP and characteristic function in 
Algorithm 1 was   2!". This corresponds to a delay increase of 
20% (the critical path is now in the OCP) if the same number 
of pipeline stages is used. However, this delay overhead can 
be reduced to 0 if an extra pipeline stage is added in one of the 
OCPs and its corresponding checker. The area and power 
overheads of this change were found to be negligible. 
Additional results for 272 and 280 SB configurations for each 
OCP bit are given in Table IV. To simulate the detection 
probability, a uniformly random number of bit flips were 
introduced to the system at uniformly random times.  
 
Fig. 16. Area and power overheads and detection probability for secure 
OpenRISC 1200 processor design using randomized parity codes with   2!" SB 
configurations per check bit for all OCPs and checkers.  
Most of the area overhead of randomized parity coding is 
due to the inefficient logic reduction of the OCP. This results 
in a significant portion of the OCP resembling the original 
function. While this seems to imply that the chip is vulnerable 
to sophisticated attacks (i.e., an adversary can make the same 
change to the original function and OCP), SB programmability 
prevents such attacks by breaking up logic cones in the OCP 
(Section III). The logic reduced and pre-logic reduced forms 
of the OCP for all OpenRISC modules were compared to see 
how many wires corresponding to the inputs to the parity 
functions (i.e. in[k-1:0] in Fig. 15) were retained. More than 
99% of these nets were found to be reduced, rendering finding 
full logic cones from the original circuit difficult. Although 
SB programmability creates additional overhead, the marginal 
area (17-33%) and power (0.4%) costs are low compared 
those of the OCP functions.  
 
C.  Secure FPGA demonstration 
To demonstrate TPAD in FPGAs, an FPGA using 
randomized parity coding to secure the I/O signals was 
fabricated in 65nm CMOS technology. Since the FPGA is 
programmable (discussed in Section II), logic CED can be 
mapped to the CLBs to protect the FPGA-mapped logic. 
However, as discussed in Section II, FPGAs can still be 
vulnerable to attacks. This FPGA does not contain any 
accelerator blocks, but the I/O ports of the FPGA still must be 
protected against pin attacks (Appendix A). Additionally, the 
memory row decoder needs to be protected. The inputs to the 
FPGA are encoded with a randomized parity code. This 
encoding is checked on every clock cycle for errors (Fig. 17). 
 
Fig. 17. Pin attack protection for FPGA. Chip in testing board, die photo, and 
block diagram shown. An example of an emulated pin attack is also shown. 
 
The design uses 3 check bits for each of the 4 I/O blocks 
and an additional 3 bits for the memory row decoder, yielding 
an area overhead of 15% and a power overhead of 0.07% with 
no critical path delay change. Pin attacks were emulated at the 
inputs to the chip by selecting random bits of the input stream 
to be flipped. The checker was monitored to see if the attack 
was detected. The detection rate for pin attacks was 87.5%, 
matching the theoretical prediction. Area, power, and delay 
overheads and detection probability for both circuits 
(OpenRISC CPU and FPGA) are summarized in Table V.  
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Overheads for # of SB configurations / OCP bit  Logic Attack 
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TABLE V. RESULTS FOR TPAD WITH RANDOMIZED PARITY 
V. OVERHEAD REDUCTION VIA SPECIALIZED OCP FUNCTIONS 
While randomized parity for logic CED offers high Trojan 
detection probability for arbitrary designs, it does not 
necessarily offer the best area overheads (similar to 
application-specific trade-offs for fault-tolerant computing 
[19]). Application-specific methods can possibly decrease the 
area overhead. However, since sophisticated Trojans are able 
to escape many checks (as discussed in Section II), 
application-specific CED techniques for fault-tolerant 
computing cannot be used unmodified for TPAD. For 
example, sum of squares (a common CED technique for Fast 
Fourier Transform (FFT) circuits [36]) cannot detect any 
attack that permutes (in any arbitrary way) the FFT outputs.  
A. LZ data compression engine 
For certain invertible functions, the inverse is simpler to 
implement than the forward function. In such cases, TPAD 
can use the inverse to detect Trojans efficiently. We 
demonstrate this by implementing a Lempel-Ziv (LZ) data 
compressor chip. The chip uses the sliding-window version of 
the LZ data compression algorithm [45] (i.e. LZ77). The CED 
scheme used to protect the encoder is described in [23]. A 
LZ77 codeword is represented as a fixed length binary tuple (𝐶!,𝐶! ,𝐶!)  where 𝐶!  is the pointer to the location in the 
dictionary, 𝐶! is the match length and 𝐶! is the next character. 
To detect attacks, the LZ codeword is decompressed by a 
dictionary lookup and compared with a copy of the input 
stored in a buffer. If there is any mismatch, an error has 
occurred. Because LZ77 is a lossless compression algorithm, 
changing a codeword to any other word will result in errors 
being detected.  This inverse function method alone, however, 
is not enough to prevent an adversary from inserting Trojans. 
For instance, an adversary can make the same change to the 
output of the inverse function and the output of the input 
buffer to make the compared words match. Thus, SB 
programmability realized with RRAM (Section III), is needed 
for the CED. Moreover, output encoding and input decoding 
for the I/Os of the chip are needed to protect against pin 
attacks. 
Since the dictionary keeps a record of past inputs, this CED 
method will detect not only any logic attack, but also 
decoupling attacks (Appendix A) in the compressor since the 
pointers to each dictionary entry change after every cycle. 
Thus, a previous LZ77 codeword will no longer point to the 
same entry in the dictionary.  
A block diagram and die photo of our split-manufactured 
test chip, implemented in 65nm technology, with secure I/O 
encoding (Section II.A-B) is shown in Fig. 18. To emulate 
logic attacks, a number of random flip-flops inside the chip 
were flipped at random times using a scan chain. To emulate 
electrical attacks, flip-flop values were reverted to their 
previous value (setup time violation) or changed to their next 
value (hold time violation). To emulate reliability attacks, 
internal wires were forced high or low at random times. Pin 
attacks (Appendix A) were emulated by flipping a uniformly 
random number of bits in at the primary inputs at a uniformly 
random time. The test setup used and a sample result is shown 
in Fig. 18c. The error signal was monitored for detected 
attacks and we observed a 99.998% detection rate for logic 
attacks (Table VI) at 99.6% for pin attacks. 
The 0.002% of undetected logic attacks were those that 
degraded the compression ratio but did not alter the 
decompressed word [23]. For example, when the LZ 
compressor is stuck at an “unmatched” state, meaning no input 
character ever matches anything in the dictionary, no 
compression is achieved ( 𝐶! = 0 ). Thus, the LZ 
de-compressor will output the original string instead of 
reading from its dictionary. 
 
Fig. 18. LZ Encoder design using TPAD. a) Die photo of LZ encoder using 
TPAD fabricated in 65nm technology. b) Block diagram of an LZ encoder 
using TPAD. The OCP is an input buffer while the checker is made from the 
inverse function and an equality checker. 64 RRAM switchboxes were 
inserted using Algorithm 1 along the cones ending at each of the 24 output 
bits. c) Test setup for Trojan emulation with sample output result.  
 
The tradeoff between the CR and the area overhead required 
to secure the design was further analyzed. Configurations of 
the LZ77 compressor for dictionary sizes ranging from 16 to 
256 words, maximum matched length ranging from 4 to 256 
words, and input word width ranging from 8 to 32 bits were 
synthesized and placed-and-routed using the Nangate 45nm 
standard cell library [40]. The tradeoff between the CR and the 
area is shown in Fig. 19. The CR is calculated experimentally 
by compressing a text file containing Shakespeare’s Hamlet. 
As dictionary sizes and input word widths increase, the 
de-compressor area to compressor area ratio decreases since 
the de-compressor dictionary is implemented with an SRAM 
while the compressor dictionary is implemented with a 
flip-flop-based shift register. Thus, the minimum relative areas 
were achieved with the maximum dictionary size and 
maximum input word widths. Increasing the maximum 
matched length increases the CR without significantly 
affecting the area overhead of TPAD since only a few gates 
are changed. However, the CR increase levels off at a 
maximum matched length of 16 words since it is difficult to 
find matching substrings beyond 16 characters in Hamlet. 
For example, suppose a design requires a CR of 1.38, the 
area overhead of implementing this design with TPAD using 
SB programmability would be 34% with a 10% power 
overhead (shown in Fig. 19a). If SB programmability is not 
needed, the area overhead would decrease to 32%. Sacrificing 
a small amount of CR can reduce the area cost further. If 0% 
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area overhead is needed, one can incur a 7% decrease in CR 
from 1.38 to secure the design (Fig. 19b). The area overhead 
of SB programmability is 0.04% in this case. 
 
Fig. 19. CR and area tradeoff for LZ encoder design. a) Relative area and 
power compared to an LZ encoder design without TPAD for fixed CR. b) CR 
for fixed area. Results shown are after physical design using the Nangate 
45nm library. 
B. Fast Fourier Transform engine 
To further demonstrate the impact that OCP selection can 
have on the area overhead of TPAD, we implement a 
pipelined Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) engine. The FFT 
engine is implemented using the Cooley-Tukey algorithm [41] 
with half-precision floating-point arithmetic. 
While Parseval’s theorem is a popular CED method for FFT 
circuits [36], an adversary can change the output of the FFT 
such that the sum of squares is still preserved. For example, an 
adversary can permute the outputs in arbitrary ways and still 
preserve the sum of squares. Thus, Parseval’s theorem cannot 
be used for Trojan detection. Instead, we make use of the 
Plancherel theorem for the Discrete Fourier Transform, stated 
below. 
Plancherel Theorem. Let   𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ ℂ!   have Discrete Fourier 
Transforms  𝑋,𝑌 ∈ ℂ!, respectively. Let 𝑦∗,𝑌∗  be the complex 
conjugates of 𝑦,𝑌  respectively. Then 𝑥!𝑦!∗!!!!!! = 1𝑁 𝑋!𝑌!∗
!!!
!!! . 
To secure an FFT chip, one might think to randomly select 
a pre-computed Fourier Transform pair y, Y and verify that 
equality in the Plancherel Theorem holds for the observed 
input-output pair 𝑥,𝑋. However, since the FFT engine (like 
many arithmetic circuits in general [44]) is implemented with 
floating-point arithmetic, roundoff errors could corrupt the 
output, leading to many false positive Trojan detection 
outcomes.  Hence, CED techniques that use comparisons of 
floating-point numbers to detect Trojans must have a way of 
distinguishing between errors due to finite-precision effects 
and errors due to attacks. 
While roundoff has traditionally been analyzed via a 
probabilistic model [42], it is not at all random (the magnitude 
of numerical error at the output of a finite-precision 
computation is a deterministic function of the inputs [43]). 
TPAD for FFT circuits allows the designer to specify an 
acceptable level T for numerical errors (which can be chosen 
based on the specifics of the arithmetic implementation). 
Errors that exceed this threshold are considered attacks. 
Explicitly, let x be the input to an N-point FFT circuit and let T 
be the threshold. If the FFT output is X’ where  𝑥!𝑦!∗!!!!!! − 1𝑁 𝑋′!𝑌!∗
!!!
!!! > 𝑇 
then the checker reports a Trojan attack. In hardware, vectors 
y and Y can be any pre-computed Fourier Transform pair and 
should be programmed upon startup of the chip. Similar CED 
methods were analyzed for general floating-point operations in 
[44]. It was shown that 𝑦∗,𝑌∗  could be chosen as periodic 
vectors with 𝑦∗ ! = !! 𝑌∗ ! = 1   in order to minimize 
roundoff while maintaining sensitivity to errors. While an 
attacker can force 𝑦∗,𝑌∗ to zero to bypass the CED test, this 
requires substantial hardware to be added to the chip and it can 
easily be detected after manufacturing (Appendix A).  
  A block diagram of the architecture is shown in Fig. 20a. 
The OCP computes the inner product of the input and y* while 
the checker computes the inner product of the output and Y* 
and compares it to the output of the OCP. The design was 
synthesized and placed-and-routed in Nangate 45nm 
technology [40]. Fig. 20b shows the overhead compared to the 
number of points in the FFT. For larger FFT designs, the 
overhead decreases. The CED circuits take 4% area overhead 
for a 128-point FFT. I/O encoding to protect against pin 
attacks incurs another 3.4% area overhead, yielding a total of 
7.4% area overhead. The power overheads were found to be 
the same as the area overheads. 
 
Fig. 20. a) Block diagram of the specialized OCP function implementing the 
Plancherel theorem. b) Relative area and power compared to those of the FFT. 
 
Logic attack coverage was found to be 99% (Table VI), 
where the 1% corresponded to Trojans that altered both the 
OCP and FFT outputs such that the Plancherel theorem was 
still satisfied for the y and Y vectors chosen. In these 
simulations, random white noise was used for y and its 
corresponding FFT was used as Y. The vectors used had small 
norm to prevent overflow and none of the values in y or Y were 
zero. All electrical and reliability attacks were caught while 
pin attack coverage remained at 99.6% with 8 check bits. 
VI. PREVENTION OF CAD TOOL ATTACKS 
 While switchbox programmability protects against 
reverse-engineering during fabrication, the design phase is still 
vulnerable to attacks by CAD tools [6]. Since CAD tools have 
complete information of the entire chip design, it is possible 
for them to strategically insert Trojans such that the Trojan 
detection circuitry cannot detect them (e.g., a Trojan is 
inserted in both the main function and in the OCP such that 
predicted check bits and actual check bits are still equal). 
Verification-based methods for detecting Trojans can be used 
[14] [104] but are prone to false-negatives (i.e., the Trojan 
may not be detected). It is likely that all fabricated chips will 
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contain such Trojans; thus, these Trojans can be detected by 
destructively testing a few chips after fabrication (Section VII. 
A). However, if CAD tool providers have close relationships 
with foundries, it may be possible to fabricate a limited 
amount of chips containing Trojans along with the Trojan-free 
chips (Section VII. A). A split-design flow with TPAD can 
ensure Trojan detection (after fabrication). 
 The split design flow (shown in Fig. 21a) is used to 
decouple checker information from original design 
information. As mentioned in Section II, we assume the 
original RTL is Trojan-free; thus, it is used by a trusted script 
to generate the RTL for the Trojan detection circuitry (i.e., 
input decoding, output encoding, logic CED, and error 
encoding in Fig. 5). The original RTL and Trojan detection 
RTL are synthesized separately to prevent any CAD tool from 
receiving complete design information at any time. There must 
be no retiming during synthesis of each part to preserve the 
timing for the TPAD architecture in the final netlist. A 
malicious synthesis or physical design tool would have no 
knowledge of the other part of the chip when inserting a 
Trojan.  
 
Fig. 21. a) Split design flow for security against compromised CAD tools. The 
potentially compromised tools are highlighted in red. Synthesis tools and 
Place and Route tools are potentially compromised. b) Original GDS and 
checker GDS are merged into a single GDS file.  
 
Fig. 21b illustrates the outcomes of this split-design flow. A 
trusted floorplanning script is used to partition the die into 
separate blocks (one for original design and one for Trojan 
detection circuitry). The original and Trojan detection portions 
are place-and-routed separately, each keeping its counterpart 
black-boxed. After physical design, the two layouts are 
merged with a simple, trusted, script and sent for fabrication. 
The split design flow is required when malicious CAD tools 
are assumed in the threat model, regardless of whether or not 
split-manufacturing is used. Requirements are summarized in 
Table VII.  
Designs were synthesized and place-and-routed with our 
split-design flow and compared with those without the 
split-design flow. Specifically, circuits were compared for 
functionality (LVS), critical path delay, and total area. Our 
results (Table VIII) show that there is no decrease in 
performance in the split-design flow compared to a traditional, 
non-split-design flow. 
VII. SURVEY OF TROJAN DETECTION METHODS 
A. Destructive vs. Nondestructive Methods 
 Methods for detecting hardware Trojans can be divided into 
destructive and nondestructive methods. Destructive methods 
include post-manufacture tests and/or inspections that render 
the chip to be non-operational (or change its lifetime reliability 
characteristics).  
Destructive methods are ideal for identifying Trojans that 
affect all (or a large number of) chips in a batch, since testing 
a few chips would be enough. For example, Scanning Electron 
Microscopy (SEM) or Focused Ion Beam (FIB) [52] could be 
used to destructively delayer chips, and verify transistors and 
interconnects. Destructive stress tests may be used to detect 
reliability attacks (Appendix A) [48].  
However, this approach becomes difficult when Trojans are 
only inserted into a select few chips. For example, assume that 
if a chip containing a Trojan is destructively tested or 
inspected, the Trojan will be found and that particular chip 
will be destroyed. Assume that if a Trojan is found, the testing 
procedure stops and the rest of the batch is declared 
untrustworthy. Let N be the total number of chips in the batch 
and let a be the total number of attacked chips. Then, the 
probability of Trojan detection (depicted in Fig. 22 for various 
scenarios) by sampling t chips and testing them individually is                                 ℙ attack  detected =   1 −    1 − !!!!  !!!!!!  
 
Fig.  22. Probability of detecting a Trojan in a batch of chips with destructive 
testing of individually sampled chips. Curves are labeled with n: total number 
of chips in batch and a: number of chips with Trojans. 
For a batch of 100000 chips, assuming 0.05% of them 
contains a Trojan (a=50), 8% of the chips must be destroyed to 
achieve 99% Trojan detection probability. However, for a 
batch of only 10000 chips with 0.05% (a=5), of them 
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TABLE VIII: COMPARISON OF SPLIT DESIGN FLOW VS NON-SPLIT FLOW 
Circuit Performance Loss Area Difference LVS Pass 
LZ77 
OpenRISC 
FFT64 
No 
No 
No 
0% 
0% 
0% 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
TABLE VII: SUMMARY OF HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS UNDER VARIOUS MANUFACTURING AND ATTACK MODELS  
Manufacturing Technology 
No Split-manufacturing Split-manufacturing after M1  
 CAD Attacks Only Foundry Attacks Only Both CAD Attacks Only Foundry Attacks Only Both 
Feature: Logic/ Pin/ Electrical 
Reverse 
Engineer 
Logic/ 
Pin/ Electrical 
Reverse 
Engineer Reliability All 
Logic/ 
Pin/ Electrical 
Reverse 
Engineer 
Logic/ 
Pin/ Electrical 
Reverse 
Engineer Reliability All 
TPAD Arch. R N R R R R R N R N R R 
Programmability R R R R N R N N N N N N 
Split Design R R N N N R R R N N N R 
R – This feature is required to protect against the above set of attacks when the above manufacturing technology is used. 
N – This feature is not required to protect against the above set of attacks when the above manufacturing technology is used. 
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containing a Trojan, 58% of the chips must be destroyed to 
achieve the same confidence. If only 0.01% of the chips 
contained a Trojan (a=1), 99% of the chips would have to be 
destroyed. Thus, nondestructive methods are needed when a 
relatively small number of chips are attacked or batch size is 
small. 
  
B. TPAD vs. other techniques 
 The following list categorizes various methods for Trojan 
prevention and detection. A comparison is given in Table IX. 
1. Split-Manufacturing: A split at the first metal layer (or very 
low metal layers) can prevent an untrusted foundry from 
reverse-engineering a design since most interconnects are 
missing [46][47]. However, split manufacturing does not 
provide Trojan detection by itself. Destructive stress tests on 
selected back-end-of-line stacks can detect reliability attacks 
[48]. Trusted monitor chips stacked on top of an untrusted 
chip using through-silicon vias (TSVs) may be used to 
actively detect attacks [49] or selected wires may be lifted 
(using TSVs) to a secure layer to obfuscate a design [106]. 
Large TSV pitch can lead to area inefficiencies [50]. 
2. Imaging: Trojans can be detected by Electromagnetic 
radiation (EMR) imaging to search for physical anomalies 
[51][53]. This approach does not prevent an adversary from 
reverse-engineering the design. Scanning Electron 
Microscopy (SEM) or Focused Ion Beam (FIB) can also be 
used, but they require delayering the chip, thus destroying it 
[52].  
3. Logic Encryption: These nondestructive techniques prevent 
Trojans by placing additional logic gates and making them 
partially controllable [54][55]. These methods do not offer 
Trojan detection. [56] is a concurrent method to prevent 
Trojans by using external modules to control operation. 
However, delay penalties are introduced and additional pins 
are required. 
4. FSM Analysis: The state transition diagram of a circuit is 
modified so that a specific sequence of transitions must take 
place before the circuit operates according to the initial 
design [57][58]. Since an untrusted foundry could have 
access to the entire design, the state transitions can possibly 
be inferred. RTL-level Trojans may be detected by 
identifying signals that rarely change [59][60]. This 
approach can result in false positives and it cannot detect 
any Trojans inserted by the foundry.  
5. Active Monitoring: These nondestructive techniques allow 
for Trojan detection by monitoring (some of) a chip’s 
functional behavior during runtime [61]-[66] (e.g. control 
signals in a processor). [61] is limited to RTL-level Trojans. 
[62] requires a snapshot of all I/O signals of a chip to be 
obtained periodically and analyzed for attacks. In addition, 
these techniques only monitor a subset of signals (and the 
properties to be checked may not be exhaustive), leaving the 
systems vulnerable to attacks. [63]-[66] require 
reconfigurable logic (e.g., FPGAs), thus greatly increasing 
area overheads.  
6. Delay Fingerprinting: These non-destructive techniques 
detect Trojans by taking delay measurements along certain 
paths and finding a difference between them and timing for 
an intended design [67]-[69]. If a Trojan is inserted, the 
delay may not match the model. While [70][71] present 
strategies for inserting test points to make various paths 
observable, these methods are prone to false positives since 
Trojans must be distinguished from variability and noise 
[89].  
7. Switching Power Analysis: These techniques detect Trojans 
by measuring dynamic current waveforms and comparing 
with a model for an intended design [74]-[79]. If there is a 
significant difference between the two current waveforms, a 
Trojan is assumed. [78][79] are concurrent solutions that 
perform classification in real-time. These methods are prone 
to false positives since Trojans must be distinguished from 
variability and noise. 
8. Gate Level Characterization (GLC): Measurements are 
taken, leakage power [81]-[83] or delays of individual gates 
TABLE IX: COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT TROJAN DETECTION AND PREVENTION SCHEMES 
Approach Refs Prevention or 
Detection 
Destructive Split-manufacture 
Required? 
Attacks 
Covered 
Area Overhead Concurrent False  
Positives 
TPAD This paper Both No No 1-6 7.4 - 165% based on design  Yes No 
Split after M1 [46]-[47]  Prevention No Yes 1 0 % No N/A 
Test-only BEOL [48] Both Yes Yes 1-5 (~) Dies destroyed No No 
3D chip stacking [49] Both No Yes 1, 3-6 TSVs, Control Chip Yes No 
EMR Imaging [51],[53] Detection No No 2-4 (^+) 0 % No No 
SEM or FIB [52] Detection Yes No 2-5 (~) Dies destroyed No No 
XOR or LUT Insertion [54][55] Prevention No No 1 Gates + Pins No N/A 
Silencing [56] Prevention No No 1-3($) Encryption, Input Reorder Yes N/A 
HARPOON [57][58] Prevention No No 1 5 – 20 % No N/A 
FANCI, FIGHT [59][60] Prevention No No 1 ($) 0 % No Yes 
Control Monitoring [61][62] Detection No Yes (#) 2-6(&) Monitoring Circuits Yes No 
FPGA w/ Checking [63]-[66]   Both No No 1, 3-6 FPGA Yes No 
On-chip sensing of delays [67]-[71] Detection No Yes (#) 2-6(&*) Second clock, latches, sensors. Can be Yes 
BISA [72][73] Detection No No 2-4(&*) ATPG logic and pins No No 
TeSR [74][75] Detection No Yes (#) 2-4(&*) Retry+Sense+Compare logic No Yes 
Dynamic power [76][77]  Detection No No 2-4 (*^) Dummy FFs No Yes 
GLC [81]-[84]  Detection No No 2-4 (*^) 0 % No Yes 
Multimodal Fingerprinting [85]-[88]  Detection No Can be (#) 2-4 (*^) Can be 0% Can be Yes 
Random Test Patterns [90]-[91] Detection No No 2-4 (^) 0 % No No 
ODETTE/ VITAMIN [92]-[93] Both No Yes (#) 1-4 (^) 𝑸 and 𝑸!  pins No No 
Attack Coverage Meanings: 1-Prevents Reverse-Engineering, 2-Detects Pin Attacks, 3-Detects Logic Attacks, 4-Detects Electrical Attacks, 5-Detects Reliability 
Attacks, 6-Detects Circuit Errors. Conditions Meanings: *-Determined by variability/confidence interval, &-Only along monitored paths, ^- Only those found by 
test vectors, +-Only top/bottom layers and uncongested middle, ~-Remaining chips insecure, $-RTL Level Only, #-Security monitors built by trusted foundry 
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[84] are estimated, and Trojans are identified. GLC shares 
the limitations of other fingerprinting techniques (e.g., [89]). 
9.  Multimode Fingerprinting: Several fingerprinting methods 
are combined and GLC can be used to compare the results 
with a model [85]-[88]. While stronger, these methods share 
similar limitations as GLC. 
10. Activation by Test Vectors: Random test patterns are 
used to attempt to activate Trojans during post-manufacture 
testing [90]-[93]. [92]-[93] introduce programmability to 
accelerate Trojan activation during post-manufacture testing 
and to provide logic encryption. However, these methods 
are non-concurrent; thus, they are not able to detect Trojans 
that activate after post-manufacture testing (e.g. 
time-bombs, reliability attacks, etc.). 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
TPAD protects digital systems from hardware Trojan 
attacks through a combination of special concurrent error 
detection techniques and selective programmability. As a 
result, it can prevent and detect hardware Trojans with high 
probability and with no false positives. We demonstrated a 
variety of detection techniques, from general randomized 
parity coding (that can be expensive for general designs) to 
specialized detection techniques (tailored for special 
functions) that significantly reduce TPAD area overheads. 
Hardware test chip results demonstrate the effectiveness and 
practicality of TPAD. 
While many aspects of TPAD have been extensively 
explored in this paper, several opportunities for future work 
remain. These include:  
1. SB insertion algorithms that avoid degenerate cases 
and/or ensure that multiple checking circuits can be created 
(Section III).   
2. Software checking techniques that can complement 
TPAD for systems supporting both hardware and software 
programmability.  
3. Techniques for recovering from hardware Trojan attacks 
(Appendix B). 
APPENDIX A: TYPES OF HARDWARE TROJANS 
We categorize hardware Trojans by their physical locality. 
We split core attacks into subcategories relating to the type of 
circuit element modified and decoupling attacks into 
subcategories relating to the specific details of the attack.  
1. Pin Attacks: The logical value of a pin is flipped 
(Illustrated in Fig. 23a) before the core logic of the chip. 
2. Core Attacks: The core logic is modified such that at least 
one incorrect output sequence is produced during operation 
(Illustrated in Fig. 23b). This includes: 
a. Logic attacks: additional circuitry is added or existing 
circuitry is modified to cause erroneous outputs of a logic 
block (Fig. 1a). 
b. Reliability attacks: Modification to transistors or wires to 
cause physics-induced failures over time (Fig. 1c). 
c. Electrical attacks: Modification to the wiring of the chip 
to change the timing of the circuit (Fig. 1b). 
3. Decoupling attacks: The TPAD checking circuitry is 
bypassed and fed a set of valid inputs while incorrect data is 
sent through the main logic (Fig. 23c). This includes: 
a. Stored state: A set of flip-flops stores an earlier (valid) 
state of the system. At some arbitrary point in time, this 
state is sent through the logic CED (thereby forcing valid 
error signals), while arbitrary changes are made to the 
main logic (Fig. 23c). If n is the number of flip-flops in 
the design, this attack requires at least n extra flip-flops. 
b. FFT zeroing: When the Plancherel Theorem is used as a 
CED technique for FFT circuits (Section V.B), one can 
pull y* and Y* to zero to force a valid error signal. 
Permanent grounding is very simple to detect, as one can 
always choose a y and Y that are not corresponding FFT 
pairs as part of a non-destructive post-manufacture test 
and check to that the error monitor actually reports an 
error. The more stealthy case for such an attack would be 
to add a single pull-down transistor and a pass-transistor 
for each of the non-sign bits of the y* and Y* signals. 
Thus, it would require at least 120N additional 
minimum-sized transistors to attack an N-point 
half-precision floating-point FFT (15 non-sign bits in a 
half-precision floating point word; 2 transistors needed 
per bit; y*,Y* each have a real word and imaginary word). 
c. Randomized parity nulling: Because randomized parity 
codes are linear (Section IV.A), the all-zero sequence is 
always a codeword [24]. If randomized parity codes are 
used in output encoding (Section II.A), the primary 
outputs can be changed to all zeros and the previous 
output check bits can be reused. This would evade the 
input decoding procedure (Section II.B). This attack can 
be prevented if a nonlinear code is used instead of a linear 
code [35]. This attack requires at least 2 transistors per 
primary output bit and 1 flip-flop per output check bit. 
For the circuits analyzed in this work, Table X gives a lower 
bound (i.e., minimum of attacks 3a-3c) on the additional area 
and transistors needed to implement a decoupling attack in 
different technology nodes, when the extra hardware is added 
to a 2D chip. These attacks require enough hardware, that they 
can be detected by the following sequence of non-destructive 
post-manufacture inspections: 
1. Un-packaged chips: the backside of every chip can be 
imaged using an X-ray imaging technique [53], revealing 
the transistor contacts (if their dimensions are > 30nm). 
Total number of transistors can then be estimated and 
compared with the GDS. If contact dimensions are < 30nm, 
then optical or IR imaging, with 2-3𝜇m resolution, may be 
used to compare the total area with the GDS [80] [94]. 
2. Packaged chips: the package of every chip must be removed 
and the backside of the chips must be polished non- 
destructively [94]. Then inspect them as un-packaged chips. 
The chips must be packaged or re-packaged in a trusted 
facility before being used in the field. 
 
Fig. 23. Types of Trojans. a) Pin attack: the inputs to the chip are altered 
before any computation by the core logic. b) Core attack: the Boolean output 
of a function inside the core is changed. c) Decoupling attack: the Trojan 
detection circuitry is fed with correct stimuli while the main logic is hijacked. 
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While the above steps are sufficient if the decoupling attack 
hardware is added to a chip, they may not be sufficient if the 
adversary attempts to replace existing filler cells [107] within 
a design with the decoupling attack hardware. If there are a 
large number of filler cells within a design, an adversary at the 
foundry can remove these filler cells and fit the circuitry for an 
attack within the resulting empty area. With no net area 
increase, and if the contacts are sufficiently small (<30nm), 
attacks are difficult to detect with standard X-Ray, IR, or 
optical imaging. To prevent such scenarios, [107] provides a 
strategy for designing custom filler cells with a very high 
reflectance at near-IR wavelengths. Attacks that replace these 
filler cells can then be detected using backside optical imaging 
[107].  
TABLE X. MINIMUM ADDITIONAL OVERHEAD FOR DECOUPLING ATTACK 
 Additionally, denial of service (DoS) attacks may be 
attempted during chip design and fabrication. DoS attacks 
during design time include wrong synthesis, ignored design 
constraints, physical design tools refusing to place and/or 
route correctly, and tools reporting wrong values for timing. 
By using a split design flow (Section VI), tools do not know 
the entire design at the time of synthesis and layout. Thus, if 
design-time DoS attacks are not caught during verification, 
they cannot be made in a way that evades detection by the 
checking circuitry during runtime. If DoS attacks are caught 
during verification, re-synthesis or re-P&R with another tool 
may allow for recovery. However, recovery in the field can be 
difficult since the wrong chip was manufactured (Appendix 
B). Another family of DoS attacks can happen at the foundry. 
These include the foundry skipping certain metal layers or 
using technology parameters other than the ones specified to 
the designer. These types of attacks may be caught in 
post-manufacture testing. Recovery, however, is not an option. 
  The last family of DoS attacks only manifest after 
fabrication. They include chips (or some parts of a chip) 
turning off after a rare logic sequence or at a specific time. 
TPAD concurrently detects such attacks, since the parts of the 
chip that fail to turn on will produce incorrect error signals. 
However, these attacks can be difficult to recover from as they 
could cause permanent shorts or open circuits in the chip.  
APPENDIX B: OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY TECHNIQUES 
Trojan detection can trigger on-line recovery and repair 
modes. Potential recovery methods differ depending on the 
type of Trojan. For instance, methods based on time 
redundancy such as detection and retry [95], checkpointing 
and rollback [96], and CRTR and SRTR [97] in 
multi-threaded parallel systems can be tried to recover the 
chip. However, these techniques only work when Trojans are 
transient, meaning they are triggered by time and not by a 
specific state of the chip, and they do not cause permanent 
damage such as shorting the power signals. For Trojans that 
are not necessarily transient, error-correction [24] using codes 
stronger than those of Section IV (requires additional error 
correction hardware) could be used for recovery. In distributed 
systems with hardware redundancy, if only a small proportion 
of chips are infected with a permanent or state-triggered 
Trojan, Spares [19], N-Modular Redundancy [98], Consensus 
[99], Coordinated Checkpointing [100], or Byzantine Fault 
Tolerance in distributed systems [101] can be implemented to 
recover from attacks at the cost of additional area overhead. 
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